ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
igration problems have been studied actively in many countries throughout the world, as the information / migration prediction / data is extremely useful on a large economic scale. Migration prediction data can stipulate development of facilities necessary to advance employment, education, ecology, etc. Reciprocally, locations with more advanced infrastructure, higher employment capacities, ecology-friendly environment, etc., can attract more potential migrants. On the other hand, overloaded housing/infrastructure facilities may reduce the comfort in the everyday life. Therefore, one can expect a tradeoff in the investments into the locations' infrastructures balanced at a conjectural variations equilibrium state. In the due time period, various migration theories have been developed. In the short historical aspect, one may rely on the excellent fundamental survey Akkoyunlu and Vickerman (2001) . In their previous papers Kalashnikov et al. (2007 Kalashnikov et al. ( , 2008 , the authors extended the latter model to the case where the conjectural variations coefficients may be not only constants, but also functions of the total population at the destination and of the group's fraction in it. Moreover, we allow these functions to take distinct values at the abandoned location and at the destination, which should elevate the model's flexibility. As an experimental verification of the proposed model, we developed a specific form of the model based upon relevant population data of a three-city agglomeration at the boundary of two Mexican states: Durango (Dgo.) and Coahuila (Coah.) Namely, we consider the 1980-2005 dynamics of population growth in the three cities: Torreón (Coah.), Gómez Palacio (Dgo.) and Lerdo (Dgo.), and propose utility functions of three various kinds for each of the three cities. To our knowledge, utility functions of these types were not used in the previous literature dealing with the human migration model. After having collected necessary information about the average movement and transportation (i.e., migration) costs for each pair of the cities, we apply the above-mentioned human migration model to this example. Numerical experiments have been conducted with interesting results concerning the probable equilibrium states revealed.
The main novelty of the recent paper Kalashnykova et al. (2011) lies in the proposed definitions of consistent conjectures and in the outskirt of possible ways to calculate the consistent conjectures and the related consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVES).
Motivated by the ideas of bi-level structures of processes of migration (the upper level competition among municipalities, and the lower level equilibrium among the potential migrants), we propose a new (bi-level) formulation of the human migration model. Under general enough assumptions, we prove the existence of solutions to the bi-level program as well. Results of numerical experiments (which are underway yet) will be outlined only scarcely.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 through 3, following mainly the previous papers Kalashnikov et al. (2007 Kalashnikov et al. ( , 2008 and Kalashnykova et al. (2011) , describe the proposed bi-level human migration model, define the conjectural variations equilibrium at the lower level, and cite Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 from Kalashnikov et al. (2007, 2008) , which establish the existence and uniqueness of the lower level equilibrium as a solution of an appropriate variational inequality problem. Consistency of conjectures and the existence of the corresponding bilevel equilibrium are discussed in Section 4. Conclusion (Section 5), acknowledgments, and the list of references complete the paper. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
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This assumption is quite
These utility functions also incorporate parameters reflecting the scale of investments made by the location's authorities in order to improve the infrastructure, employment capacities, household construction, power supply, and so on. Exactly these amounts of investment play the role of the municipality strategies in the game at the upper level.
First, we describe the lower level problem. The conservation of flow equations, given for each class k and each location i, and the inequalities forbidding repeated or chain migration, are listed below:
with 01
Equation (1) states that the population of class k at location i is determined by the initial population of class k at location i plus the migration flow into i of that class minus the migration flow out of i for that class. Equation (2) affirms that the flow out of i by class k cannot exceed the initial population of class k at i, since no chain migration is allowed.
Assume that migrants are rational, and that migration continues until no individual has any incentive to move, since a unilateral decision will no longer yield a positive net gain (the gain in the expected utility minus the migration cost). s individuals, the total population of class k in i will remain equal to:
.
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We accept the following assumptions concerning the utility functions and expected variations of the utility values:
A1.
The utility ()
u u Q  is a monotone decreasing and continuously differentiable function.
A2.
Each person of class k, when considering her possibility of moving from location i to location j, takes into account not only the difference in the utility values at the initial location and the destination, but also both the expected (negative) increment of the utility function value at j
and the expected (positive) utility value increment in location i
DEFINITION OF EQUILIBRIUM

Definition of Equilibrium in the Lower Level
A multi-class population and flow pattern   
A3.
We assume that the influence coefficients are functions depending upon the current population at the location in question and the migration flow from location i to location j, satisfying the following conditions: Taking into account assumption A3 and omitting for shortness the argument * Q in the utility functions, we turn (3) into:
and if 0
Assume that the utility function associated with a particular location and a single class can depend upon the population associated with every class and each location, that is, compose a vector-function
Assume also that the cost associated with migration between two locations as perceived by a particular class can depend, in general, upon the flow of each class between every pair of locations, i.e., compose an aggregate vector-function   c c s  . Finally, let us compose an auxiliary vector of the appropriate size as follows: 
The existence of at least one solution to the variational inequality (6) follows from the general theory of variational inequalities, under the sole assumption of continuous differentiability of the utility functions u and continuity of migration cost functions c, since the feasible convex set M is compact (cf., for example, Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia, 1980) . 
involving the utility and migration cost functions, is strictly monotone over the feasible set M:
The latter is a consequence of the classical result of the Theory of Variational Inequality Problems (see, for example, Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia, 1980 
then the variational inequality (8) has at most one solution.
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the (lower level) equilibrium among the potential migrants, we may pass to the concept of the upper level equilibrium among the municipal authorities.
Definition of Equilibrium in the Upper Level
We assume that the utility function associated with location i and class k of potential migrants has the form 
where * Q is the equilibrium of the lower level population values, which (due to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2) exist uniquely for any (fixed) vector of investments R involved into the structure of locations' utility functions (9).
EXISTENCE OF A BI-LEVEL EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONSISTENT CONJECTURES
The consistency of conjectures (or, the influence coefficients) arises naturally as an important issue. Indeed, the existence of at least one equilibrium for arbitrary influence coefficients obliges one to select some justified conjectures so that the above concept of the equilibrium make sense. In this section, we propose a concept of consistency and formulate the existence result for the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium.
Based upon the consistency criterion proposed in Kalashnikov et al. (2011) , we formulate the following definition. Here, for simplicity, we repeat our assumption that the utility function for each location i and each potential migrant group k is linear of the form   
The LLE with consistent conjectures is called a consistent conjectural variations equilibrium state (CCVES) in application to the above-described human migration model. Now we are in a position to formulate the following existence result. 
